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I. INTRODUCTION
The “I Have a Dream” speech1—one of the most influential and
immediately recognizable speeches of the twentieth century—is a profoundly
moving oration that galvanized a nation. However, if a video of the speech was
posted online without permission of the copyright owner, it would be
removed—likely by using a takedown notice.2 The power that a deceased
author’s estate has over the author’s copyrighted works long after death can
have severe consequences on anyone who posts them online, and can have a
chilling effect on free speech.3 As Bill Rutherford, the executive director of the
Christian Leadership Conference, said, “I think Martin Luther King must be
spinning in his grave . . . he gave his life for his ideas of justice, peace and love.
He attempted his entire life to communicate ideas for free. To communicate,
not to sell.”4 Though this assertion is undercut by the fact that King himself
established a copyright over “I Have a Dream” shortly after his speech, the fact
remains that someone would likely have to pay twenty dollars to view the
speech legally in its entirety, by purchasing the DVD.5 Today, the rights to the
video of the speech are held by EMI Music Publishing, a music publishing
company, which means that video footage of the speech cannot be uploaded
without EMI’s permission.6 The King Estate is not alone; throughout the past
100 years, many other estates, such as the James Joyce and J.D. Salinger estates,7
have leveraged copyright to sell rather than disseminate the famous words of
their forebears. With the onset of takedown notices, the power that estates
hold over public discourse is greater than ever. The ability of the estates of
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, delivered at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadreeam.htm.
2 Alex Pasternack, Copyright King: Why the “I Have a Dream” Speech Still Isn’t Free, MOTHERBOARD,
Aug. 28, 2013, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/copyright-king-why-the-i-have-a-dream-speechstill-isn-t-free (where a content owner requests that allegedly infringing material be removed from
the web pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512).
3 See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Estate Loses Suit to Control Plays on Janis Joplin, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/18/theater/estate-loses-suit-to-control-plays-on-janis-j
oplin.html.
4 Pasternack, supra note 2.
5 Alex Pasternack, Web Activists are Waging a Guerilla War to Free Martin Luther King from
Copyright, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 22, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/internetactivists-are-waging-a-guerrilla-war-to-free-martin-luther-king-from-copyright.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Suppressing Scholarship?, NEW
YORKER, June 19, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/06/19/the-injusti
ce-collector; Gordon Bowker, James Joyce’s Grandson Stephen and Literature’s Most Tyrannical Estate,
DAILY BEAST (June 14, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/14/james-joyce-s-g
randson-stephen-and-literature-s-most-tyrannical-estate.html (discussing both Joyce and Salinger
estates).
1
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authors and orators to pull speeches, letters, and biographies down from the
public sphere has grown past the level considered by the Supreme Court only
eleven years ago when they held that the Copyright Term Extension Act
comported with the First Amendment.8
I limit this inquiry to author and orator estates because inherent in this
discussion is the idea that works created by authors and orators have distinct
educational value. Though as a society we generally shy away from valuing
different forms of speech, when copyright is abused online the effect may be
felt disparately by those seeking to educate or create derivative works that may
shine light on the original. For example, it is not beyond the realm of
possibility that high schoolers would be better educated by viewing the video of
the “I Have a Dream” speech rather than reading it in their textbook.
Dissemination through video is a powerful medium that is threatened by our
current Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) system.9
It’s unsurprising that estates zealously attempt to protect the copyrights they
hold: The estate of a dead celebrity can be extremely lucrative.10 For instance,
in 2012, Michael Jackson’s estate raked in $145 million, while Elizabeth Taylor’s
estate was able to make $210 million.11 Entertainers are not the only people
who make money long after they are dead—Charles Schultz, the creator of the
Peanuts comic strip characters, made $37 million in 2012.12
Because estates have the potential to make great sums of money after the
creator of the work is dead, they have a vested interest in keeping that work
secure and profitable. The internet is still relatively young and has transformed
the way that we transmit information and display our created works. It only
makes sense, therefore, that there is a legal mechanism in place allowing rights
holders to assert copyright claims over material posted online. However, the
current system is one that encourages bad copyright claims by “malicious”
estates, and chills free expression on the Web.13 Moreover, the DMCA’s notice
and takedown system inherently fails to record how often these negative effects
8 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 168 (2003) (petitioners made a First Amendment free speech
challenge to the extension of copyright protection to life of the creator plus seventy years. The
Court found that the CTEA comported with the First Amendment and contained adequate
safeguards of free expression.).
9 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-340, § 512, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–86
(1998).
10 Rebecca F. Ganz, Note and Commentary, A Portrait of the Artist’s Estate as a Copyright Problem,
41 LOY. L.A. REV. 739, 740 (2008).
11 Dorothy Pomerantz & Zach O’Malley Greenburg, The Top Earning Dead Celebrities 2012,
FORBES, Oct. 24, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/special-report/2012/1024_dead-celebrities.html.
12 Id.
13 Emily Meyers, Note, Art on Ice; The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 219, 233–34 (2007).
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occur. The system, which pulls material off the Web, also disincentivizes
content uploaders from fighting back or litigating a fair use defense against a
copyright holder.14 Thus, many of the “chilling effects” are felt, even if not
seen directly. However, the estate cases highlighted above are indicative of the
underlying problem online as this Note will further discuss.
Part II of this Note will discuss the United States copyright law landscape,
from its origins in the Constitution to its current state on the internet, including
a discussion of two Supreme Court challenges (Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan v.
Holder) to modern copyright laws. Part III will analyze how the considerations
the Supreme Court took into account in those cases have been warped by our
current DMCA system. In order to protect these First Amendment
considerations, several solutions will be discussed, including a modified
licensing system, an automation of the DMCA system, and several proposals
from legal commentators.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will discuss the current copyright landscape, beginning with
basic rights of copyright holders. The discussion will then turn to defenses to
copyright claims under section 106 of the Copyright Act. Next, three estates
will be presented as examples of how estates wield great power in our current
copyright system. Two challenges to our current copyright system, Eldred v.
Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder will be used to illuminate the First Amendment
considerations of copyright law. Next, a discussion of the DMCA will show
how our copyright protections often operate on the internet.
A. BASIC RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT HOLDERS

The United States Constitution itself provides the origins of copyright law
by granting Congress the power to “[P]romote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”15 The rights of
copyright holders are codified in section 106 of the Copyright Act.16 These
protections begin from the instant an author fixes a work in a tangible medium
of expression (such as a writing, drawing, sculpture, etc.) so long as the work is

14 See, e.g., David S. Olson, First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537,
554–55 (2010) (noting that a Stanford professor’s fair use claim against the Joyce estate was made
possible through access to pro bono counsel, not available to most ordinary parties).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012).
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sufficiently original.17 Copyright protection for a work lasts for the life of the
author, plus seventy years after the death of the author.18
The Copyright Act grants several exclusive rights to authors.19 First, the
right of reproduction is arguably the most important protection afforded author
and orator estates, and violations of this section lead to many lawsuits.
Copyright holders also possess the right of adaptation—or “derivative works.”20
This right requires those who write something based on a novel or play to get
the creator’s permission to avoid infringing the underlying work.21 It is this
derivative right which led the J.D. Salinger estate to file a successful suit to
prohibit publication in the United States of Frederick Colting’s 60 Years Later:
Coming Through The Rye.22 Another right belonging to authors or their estates is
the right to control the first distribution of each copy of a work to the public.23
Estates invoke this right when they want to prohibit letters and other works of
the author from becoming known. In addition, estates possess the power to
prevent the public performance24 or display of a work,25 and the ability to
control a digital audio transmission26 (such as the “I Have a Dream” speech).
Lastly, creators enjoy some moral rights to prevent their names from appearing
on material falsely attributed to them, and stop others from claiming creation of
their own works; however, these moral rights only apply to works of visual art
in limited runs.27
B. DEFENSES TO COPYRIGHT CLAIMS UNDER § 106

The Copyright Act additionally codifies several affirmative defenses available
to alleged infringers in sections 107–122.28 Perhaps the most important defense
in the context of derivative works is “fair use.”29 Courts analyze the frequently
17 Id. § 106(1)–(5). See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340,
347 (1991); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a); see also Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (retroactively extending copyright protection an additional twenty years
beyond the 1976 Copyright Act’s term for works created on or after January 1, 1978).
19 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). See also David Shipley, An Overview of Intellectual Property Law (on file with
the Journal).
20 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
21 Id.
22 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
23 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
24 Id. § 106(4).
25 Id. § 106(5).
26 Id. § 106(6).
27 Id. § 106A.
28 Id. §§ 107–122.
29 Id. § 107; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1979).
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litigated fair use defense using a balancing test.30 First, a court considers “the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of commercial
nature or is of nonprofit educational purposes.”31 Second, a judge will consider
“the nature of the copyrighted work.”32 A work that is more scientific,
technical, or less artistic weighs in favor of finding fair use.33 This second factor
embodies the fact-expression dichotomy, which draws a line between
unprotected facts or ideas and an author’s protected expression of that idea.34
Third, a court evaluates the “amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”35 The court is more likely to find
a fair use defense when smaller portions of the work are used.36 The final
factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”37
C. PROTECTION OF AUTHOR AND ORATOR ESTATES

Suits asserted to invoke the protection of one of the exclusive rights are
often invoked by estates seeking to limit the dissemination of a work. Recently,
the Martin Luther King estate, the J.D. Salinger estate, and the James Joyce
estate have exemplified the great power estates can wield.
1. Martin Luther King Estate. In the mid-1990s, CBS sought to create a
segment of The 20th Century with Mike Wallace called “Martin Luther King, Jr.
and the March on Washington.”38 In creating the segment, CBS used about
sixty percent of Martin Luther King’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech
delivered on August 28, 1963 to a crowd of about 200,000, and broadcast to a
nationwide audience.39 About a month after delivering the speech, King had
taken the necessary steps to seek copyright protection under the Copyright Act
of 1909 by registering his copyright before publishing the speech.40 When CBS
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing four factors to consider).
Id.
32 Id.
33 What is Fair Use?, http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/fair-use.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2014).
34 See Feist Publications, Inc., 490 U.S. 340, 348 (“The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does
not mean that every element of the work may be protected. Originality remains the sine qua non of
copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that
are original to the author. . . . Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not
the precise words used to present them.”); see also 17 U.S.C. 102(b).
35 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
36 What is Fair Use?, supra note 33.
37 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
38 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999).
39 Id.
40 Id.
30
31
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created the segment, however, it failed to negotiate a license with his estate, and
his estate sued for copyright infringement.41 There was some question in the
lower courts as to the facts, but there was evidence that an advance text of the
speech was available in a press tent that day.42 In addition, the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference sent out a newsletter with the exact words of
the speech.43 On appeal by the state, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the estate did have the authority to prohibit the speech from being
broadcast.44 Since the authority to broadcast the speech was granted to a
limited group for a limited purpose, the restrictions on copying and reproducing
were implied.45 In overturning summary judgment for CBS, the Eleventh
Circuit relied on precedent indicating that distribution to the new media for the
purpose of news coverage is only a limited publication46 and that, here there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a publication had occurred.47
2. J.D. Salinger Estate. Another estate is notorious for its vigorous use of
copyright, originating with the author himself: the estate of J.D. Salinger. J.D.
Salinger is best known for the book The Catcher in the Rye, published in 1951.48
After he stopped publishing books in 1965, he shunned his acquired fame,
attempting to avoid journalists and fans alike—essentially becoming what
Holden Caulfield had attempted to become in The Catcher in the Rye.49 He tried
to keep his unpublished works secret (there is evidence he continued to write
regularly and kept his writings in a fireproof safe in his home),50 and would not
allow alteration of his published works even though by doing so he was
forgoing any possible royalties.51 Despite his attempt to fade back into
obscurity, his ability to do so was severely diminished as his notoriety for closely
guarding his personal life and works reached almost the same heights as his

Id.
Id.
43 Since there was a legal question as to whether King’s permission had been given for the
distribution at the tent or through the newsletter, the court disregarded this evidence at the
summary judgment stage. See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347,
1348 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
44 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., 194 F.3d at 1218.
45 Id. See also Burke v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 598 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1979) (superseded by statute)
(allowing a man who filmed animal behavior and gave the film to a professor for use in lectures
to recover when the professor released the film to a British company).
46 Estate of Martin Luther King, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
47 Id. at 1220.
48 J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE (1951).
49 Id. at 26.
50 Kate O’Neill, Copyright Law and the Management of J.D. Salinger’s Literary Estate, 31 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 29 (2012).
51 Id.
41
42
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fame for literature in his final years.52 In a rare interview from 1976, speaking
about an unpublished set of short stories that were going to be released to the
public, Salinger said, “Someone’s appropriated [the stories]. It’s an illicit act.
It’s unfair. Suppose you had a coat you liked and somebody went into your
closet and stole it. That’s how I feel.”53 He sued for copyright infringement
with some regularity, but two cases from the Second Circuit are particularly
pertinent—Salinger v. Colting54 and Salinger v. Random House.55
In Random House, Salinger appealed to the Second Circuit an order denying
his motion for a preliminary injunction against the defendants Ian Hamilton
and Random House, who were seeking to publish a biography of Salinger called
J.D. Salinger: A Writing Life.56 This biography would have included unpublished
letters Salinger wrote to his friends and colleagues between 1939 and 1961,
including letters to Judge Learned Hand and Ernest Hemingway.57 In May of
1986, Salinger received a draft version of this biography and discovered that
these letters had been donated to various university libraries.58 He immediately
registered seventy-nine of his unpublished letters for copyright protection and
directed his lawyers to object to any publication of the biography until the
defendants removed all material from his unpublished letters.59 The defendants
failed to comply and asserted a fair use defense when Salinger subsequently
sued for infringement.60 The District Court judge found fair use, explaining
that “Hamilton’s appropriation of copyrighted expressions are too minimal to
subject Salinger to any serious harm.”61 On appeal to the Federal Circuit Judge
Newman granted a preliminary injunction, stating that even though the use of
the letters for a biography leans in favor of finding fair use, biographers do not
face a dilemma of infringing on copyright when they take only factual
information from the letters.62 However, Hamilton had used sentences in a way
that “exceed[ed] that necessary to disseminate the facts,” thereby also capturing
Salinger’s expression.63 Moreover, the copied words were a very important part
of the biography, which weighed against the defendants on the third factor of
Id.
Lacey Fosburgh, J.D. Salinger Speaks About His Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1974, at 1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/09/13/specials/salinger-speaks.html.
54 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
55 Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
56 Id. at 92.
57 Id. at 92–93.
58 Id. at 93.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 94.
61 Id. (quoting Salinger v. Random House, 650 F. Supp. 413, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
62 Id. at 96.
63 Id. at 98.
52
53
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the fair use test.64 The court denied Hamilton’s fair use defense because the
ability to copy expressive content of unpublished letters did not interfere with
“the process of enhancing public knowledge of history or contemporary
events.”65
Twenty years later, shortly before his death, Salinger filed another
infringement claim against Frederick Colting, author of 60 Years Later: Coming
Through the Rye.66 In Colting, Salinger alleged that Colting’s main character of the
novel Mr. C was obviously intended to be Holden Caulfield, the protagonist
from Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye, as an old man.67 In addition, the novel
included Salinger himself as a character.68 The trial court granted Salinger a
preliminary injunction, and held that the defendants were unlikely to be able to
mount a fair use defense—because, among other things, the defendant was at
that point calling the book a literary critique, but had previously called it a
sequel.69 The court also emphasized “some uses . . . so patently infringe
another’s copyright, without giving rise to an even colorable fair use defense,
that the likely First Amendment value in the use is virtually nonexistent.”70
After his death, Salinger’s family reached a settlement with Mr. Colting, denying
him the rights to publish 60 Years Later in the United States.71 As one
commentator reflected, “[I]n the end, Salinger could not put the genie back in
the bottle, though his faithful estate did manage to deny the genie an American
visa, for what that’s worth.”72
3. James Joyce Estate. The James Joyce estate has also prolifically sought to
invoke the protections of copyright law. Currently, the James Joyce estate is
managed by Joyce’s grandson, a man who insists on being referred to by his full
name—Stephen James Joyce.73 Since obtaining control of the estate, Joyce
crusaded to prohibit use of his grandfather’s works.74 Though there were
around 1,500 of Joyce’s letters in libraries and archives throughout the world,
should anyone attempt to publish those letters, they would be met with a
copyright claim from Stephen Joyce.75 The Joyce estate forbade the publishing
Id. at 98–99; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 100 (2d Cir. 2010).
66 Id. at 71.
67 Id. at 71–72.
68 Id. at 72.
69 Id. at 82.
70 Id. at 82–83.
71 Will Wilkinson, J.D. Salinger’s Miserly Legal Legacy, COPYWRONGS BLOG (Jan. 17, 2011, 11:57
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/01/copywrongs.
72 Id.
73 Max, supra note 7.
74 Id.
75 Id.
64
65
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of an epilogue to a biography of Joyce’s wife, which noted the years that Joyce’s
daughter Lucia spent in a mental hospital battling schizophrenia.76 Stephen
Joyce then announced that he had destroyed all letters from Lucia and
correspondence between Lucia and a former romantic partner.77 However, he
remarked that he had “not destroyed any papers or letters in my grandfather’s
hand, yet.”78
Through the years, the Joyce Estate has also litigated to try to halt public
readings of Joyce’s works. The estate even told a performance artist planning to
recite a portion of Finnegans Wake onstage that he had “already infringed” the
estate’s copyright.79 The performer, Adam Harvey, later learned that there was
no real legal way for Stephen Joyce to stop his performance within the British
legal system.80 In addition, the Joyce estate spent twenty years denying the
request by singer Kate Bush to use part of Ulysses.81 Bush first asked for
permission to use Molly Bloom’s (an important character in Ulysses) soliloquy as
part of her song “The Sensual World.”82 Finally, in 2011 Stephen Joyce allowed
Bush to use the lyrics, at which point she re-released the song under the title
“Flower of the Mountain.”83 In a display of the arbitrariness with which estates
may wield copyright power, Stephen Joyce had previously permitted the same
lyrics to be used in the Euro-pop dance hit “Yes” by Dutch pop singer
Amber.84 Though the EU considers Joyce’s works to be in the public domain,
many of his works retain their copyright protections in the U.S.85
The Joyce estate’s most famous copyright battle came in 2006 with
professor Carol Shloss.86 Shloss wrote a book about Joyce’s daughter entitled
Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake, and the estate forced her to remove much of
the book’s content.87 Lucia was met with mixed reviews, not in small part
because Schloss was unable to back up her contentions with sufficient

Id.
Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 D.T. Max, Kate Bush’s Rewrite, Reasons to ReJoyce?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 11, 2011, http://www.
newyorker.com/books/page-turner/kate-bushs-rewrite-reason-to-rejoyce.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Joyce Works in Copyright and in the Public Domain, INT’L JAMES JOYCE FOUND., http://joycefounda
tion.osu.edu/joyce-copyright/fair-use-and-permissions/about-law/public-domain (last updated Apr.
2012).
86 Max, supra note 7; see also Ganz, supra note 10.
87 Id.
76
77
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evidence.88 She later uploaded a supplement to the book designed to comport
with U.S. fair use doctrine.89 Shloss then sued the estate to gain rights to the
published works and family letters. When the parties eventually reached a
settlement, the court awarded Shloss $240,000 in legal fees.90
D. MODERN COPYRIGHT AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS

1. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. As shown by these estates, there
are major First Amendment concerns implicated when estates assert power
over their copyright works. In 1998, Congressman and singer Sonny Bono
sponsored the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which defines our
modern copyright landscape.91 Critics often derisively call this act “The Mickey
Mouse Protection Act,” because it passed right before Mickey Mouse would
have entered the public domain.92 The CTEA protected other lucrative
copyrighted works as well, including the song “Yes! We have No Bananas” and
Winnie the Pooh.93
The CTEA made several important changes to copyright law. Most
importantly, the Act increased the duration of copyright for both current and
future copyrighted works.94 Before the CTEA, copyrights lasted from the time
of the work’s creation until fifty years after the creator died, whereas now they
last from time of creation until seventy years after the death of the author.95
Though the Act did not restore copyright protections to anything then already
in the public domain, it did extend protection to many works that were about to
enter the public domain until the year 2018.96 There is an exception in the law
that allows libraries, archives, and nonprofit educational institutions to
essentially treat works as they would have been treated before the law was
88 Cynthia Haven, Stanford Researcher Gets Six-Figure Settlement from James Joyce Estate, STAN. REP.
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/september28/shloss-joyce-settlement-09
2809.html.
89 Sam Whiting, Biographer Took on Joyce’s Heirs to Quote Him, SFGATE (Mar. 18, 2010), http://
www.sfgate.com/entertainment/article/Biographer-took-on-Joyce-s-heirs-to-quote-him-3269891.
php.
90 Haven, supra note 88.
91 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
92 Jeff John Roberts, Will Copyright be Extended 20 More Years? An Old Debate Returns, GIGAOM,
Aug. 20, 2013, http://gigaom.com/2013/08/20/will-copyright-be-extended-20-more-years-an-ol
d-debate-returns/.
93 Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Primer, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/w
p-srv/technology/articles/eldredprimer_100902.htm.
94 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 303 (2012).
95 Office of the Gen. Counsel, Summary of Federal Laws, CATH. U. AM., http://counsel.cua.edu/
fedlaw/ctea.cfm (last updated May 2, 2013).
96 See Roberts, supra note 92.
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passed if they are being used for preservation, scholarship, or research.97
However, this exception only applies if the work is not subject to normal
commercial exploitation, cannot be obtained at a fair price, and the copyright
owner can stop use of the work if they provide notice.98
Miriam Nisbet, legislative counsel to the American Library Association,
argued that the CTEA would hurt the flow of information on the internet by
limiting the accessibility of information. Nisbet saw this as the main purpose of
the internet.99 In addition, she argued that the extension of copyright that far
into the future shifts the balance between creators and the public overly
towards the creators’ favor.100
2. Eldred v. Ashcroft. Others criticized the CTEA’s term extension as well.
Eric Eldred, who ran the Eldritch Press (an online publisher of public domain
works), challenged the CTEA shortly after its passage.101 Other publishers of
literature, sheet music, film and the American Library Association joined
Eldred’s challenge.102 Harvard Law professor Lawrence Lessig argued the
case.103 The Walt Disney Company, the Motion Picture Association of
America, the Recording Industry Association of America, and the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers supported the government.104
Eldred challenged the law based on two grounds: first, that the Constitution’s
Copyright Clause was violated and, second, that the law violated the First
Amendment protection of free speech.105 The Supreme Court ultimately
upheld the CTEA as valid both under the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment.106
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg offered several reasons why the
CTEA did not violate the First Amendment. First, the temporal relation
between the passage of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment

See Office of the Gen. Counsel, supra note 95; see also 17 U.S.C. § 108.
17 U.S.C. § 108(h)(2)(A)–(C).
99 See Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Primer, supra note 93 (“We see the Internet as a way of expanding
the accessibility of information for people, [and] information that may have been only available to
a few people. We hate to see that potential limited in such a way.”).
100 See id. (“It just takes [copyrights] so far into the future that the balance that you’re talking
about seems to be entirely in favor of the creators and leaving out any benefit to the public.”).
101 Id.
102 Id. (plaintiffs included a publisher of genealogies, sheet music publishers, and dealers of rare
books).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003).
106 Id.
97
98
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reasoning indicated that they are compatible with each other.107 In addition,
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that current copyright laws contained First
Amendment protections by only protecting an author’s individual expression,
rather than the underlying facts.108 Justice Ginsburg also relied on the
protections of the fair use defense as another bulwark against First Amendment
encroachment.109 Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that the CTEA provides
additional First Amendment safeguards, such as allowing libraries to reproduce
and distribute copies of certain published works for scholarly purposes during
the twenty years added by the Act, and an exemption for small businesses from
paying performance royalties on music played from licensed electronic
mediums.110
Justice Ginsburg also found the third argument that the respondents
brought lacked merit. Eldridge argued that under Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC this was an undue burden of the First Amendment like the statute at
issue in Turner.111 Ginsburg distinguished this case because the CTEA is not a
“must carry” provision; it is essentially the opposite and, therefore, does not
likewise implicate “the heart of the First Amendment.”112 Concluding, she
simply reiterated that existing First Amendment safeguards were “generally
adequate” and confirmed the constitutionality of the CTEA.113
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that this extension essentially makes the
copyright term “virtually perpetual.”114 The grant benefits not creators
themselves, but their “heirs, estates, or corporate successors. Most importantly,
its practical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit the progress of ‘Science’—by
which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge.”115 Justice Breyer also
argued that under the First Amendment Congress lacked authority to pass the
CTEA, as it risked serious “expression-related harm”—by restricting the
propagation of copyrighted works, by interfering with efforts to educate, and by
107 Id. at 219 (“This proximity [in time] indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited
monopolies are compatible with the speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote
the creation and publication of free expression.”).
108 Id. (“[T]his idea/expression dichotomy strikes a balance between the First Amendment and
the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression.” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S. Ct. 2218)).
109 Id. at 220 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 107).
110 Id.
111 Id.; see also Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (a statute required cable
operators to hold some stations open through their cable systems to promote local networks met
intermediate scrutiny because it was content neutral).
112 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 641). A “must carry” provision compels,
rather than prohibits, a carrier broadcasting of a certain kind of speech by carriers. Id. at 220–21.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115 Id.
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benefiting private financial institutions of corporations and heirs at the expense
of the public.116 For these reasons, Justice Breyer felt that the statute was
untenable under the Copyright Clause, read in the light of its First Amendment
restrictions.117
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit reevaluated the holding of Eldridge in light of a
First Amendment challenge to the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, which
“eliminated the renewal requirements for works created between 1964 and 1977
and thus extended their term,” and the CTEA, which “effected a further
extension.”118 The court in Kahle ultimately decided that the discussions in
Eldred were not dicta, and reaffirmed that retroactively extending the term of
existing copyrights does not violate the First Amendment.119 Furthermore, the
court agreed that “safeguards such as fair use and the idea/expression
dichotomy [sufficiently] vindicate the speech interests affected by the CRA and
the CTEA.”120 In all, the court essentially repeated the majority’s arguments in
Eldridge, putting to rest any lingering First Amendment judicial challenges to the
recent extensions in copyright protection.
3. Golan v. Holder. In addition to Eldred, the Supreme Court also discussed
copyright concerns intersecting with the First Amendment in Golan v. Holder.121
This suit challenged the Uruguay Rounds Agreements Act, which applied
copyright protections to foreign works between the years 1923–1989 (before
the United States joined the Berne Union).122 In effect, it took many works out
of the public domain, including works created in countries that had a copyright
relationship with the U.S. but did not have a valid U.S. copyright, works created
in countries with which the United States lacked a copyright relationship (such
as Russia and China), and all sound recordings from eligible foreign countries
published after February 15, 1972.123 According to Marybeth Peters, head of
the U.S. Copyright Office, the number of works affected by the Act would
“probably number in the millions.”124 The Act’s passage meant that those who
had their copyrights “restored” would now charge fees for works that the
challengers previously used for free.125
Id. at 266.
Id. at 266–67.
118 Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (2007).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 700 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20).
121 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
122 Id. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 904 (copyright relationships entail some form of reciprocal international copyright
protections).
124 Id.
125 Id. (noting, as an example the score of Shostakovich’s Preludes and Fugues Op. 87, the price
of which has risen sevenfold).
116
117
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In Golan v. Holder, Justice Ginsburg, again writing for the majority, analyzed
the URAA under the First Amendment.126 She noted that a restriction of the
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment is the “inherent and
intended effect of every grant of copyright.”127 However, unlike in Eldred, the
petitioners had access to the materials before they were pulled from the public
domain.128 Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg argued that the text of the Copyright
Clause and the historical record did not prevent Congress from restoring
copyrights.129 She also held that nothing warranted “exceptional First
Amendment solicitude for copyrighted works that were once in the public
domain.”130 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg rejected the argument
that there were any public “vested-rights,” noting that no one in the public
gains ownership rights as to formerly protected material once that material
passes into the public domain.131 In addition, Justice Ginsburg supported the
majority’s conclusion by noting that section 514 of the Act did not entirely
prohibit public access—it merely required licensing. As an example, Ginsburg
offered that “Peter and the Wolf could once be performed free of charge; after
§ 514 the right to perform it must be obtained in the marketplace.”132 Without
this practice, orchestral concerts with copyrighted music would not exist unless
the original composer performed them, indicating that Congress had included
necessary public access protection.133
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg also observed that implementing the Berne
Agreement standardized a copyright regime across countries, and put foreign
works in the position they would be in if the URAA had been in effect at the
time they were published.134 In her view, this spared creators the continued
effects of deprivation of royalties for their works until their copyright terms
expire, rather than taking away works from users.135
Justices Breyer and Alito took a different view from the rest of the Court.136
In Justice Breyer’s dissent, he argued that the URAA did not promote the
production of new material and imposed high costs that would severely restrict
dissemination of works that could otherwise serve educational or cultural

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 889 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 875, 891.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 892–93.
Id. at 889–91.
Id.
Id. at 899 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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purposes.137 Justice Breyer then analyzed the poor outcomes and restrictions
on dissemination springing from the Act’s practical effects.138 First, by
affording new protections to works previously in the public domain, those who
could once use works freely would often have to pay a high price.139 For
example, Justice Breyer noted how many orchestras and school music programs
would be unable to afford the new prices, and therefore would have to go
without the music they were once able to use for free.140
Next, Justice Breyer criticized the Act’s large administrative costs.141 Those
wishing to use pre-existing works must first determine whether it is a work with
restored copyright, find the copyright holder, and then negotiate a fee.142 This
is particularly problematic for “orphan works”—those works that were old and
obscure, or otherwise assigned to a copyright owner who proves difficult to
track down.143 There are millions of “orphan works,” and the cost of finding
the authors could be prohibitively high.144 Justice Breyer also argued that
administrative costs were counterproductive because they will tempt users to
pirate works rather than do without them.145 Though he did not find this to be
a content-based restriction, in concluding his dissent Justice Breyer argued that
the speech related harms in the case raised a First Amendment question as to
whether there were reasonable justifications for the harms that the Act would
impose.146
E. NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN—DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

1. The Basics of Notice and Takedown. The DMCA also shapes our modern
copyright law landscape and was created to try to strike a balance between
internet service providers (ISPs), internet hosts, and users.147 The DMCA
includes a “safe harbor provision” in the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act.148 The purpose of the provision is essentially to
protect from infringement liability the service providers who cannot keep track

Id. at 899–912.
Id. at 900.
139 Id. at 904–05.
140 Id. at 905.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 906.
146 Id. at 907–08.
147 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2873–74 (Oct. 28,
1998).
148 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2012).
137
138
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of posts they facilitate on their site.149 In order to fall within the safe harbor, an
ISP must not have knowledge of or financial benefit that can be directly traced
from the infringing content present on the network, must have a copyright
policy and inform its subscribers of that policy, and must list an agent to deal
with copyright complaints.150 Once providers find out from the copyright
owner that they are hosting potentially copyright infringing material, the
provider has a duty to take it down and a duty to inform the person who
uploaded the content; however, the provider has no duty to investigate whether
the material actually infringes on copyright.151
2. Notice and Takedown in Practice. The system of “notice and takedown”
starts when a service provider receives notice of an alleged infraction from a
copyright owner.152 Next, the ISP will remove the material from the internet or
block access to it, as is required under the safe harbor provision.153 The ISPs
must take “reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has
removed or disabled access to the material.”154 To have the material replaced,
the person who uploaded it must file a counter-notice.155 After the counternotice has been sent, the ISPs must re-enable the content between ten and
fourteen business days later, unless the copyright holder has by that point filed a
lawsuit.156
Under 17 U.S.C. § 512, when a service provider receives a notice of possible
infringement, that provider must take the material down quickly.157 The
material will remain offline unless the uploader provides a counter-notice.158 In
the counter-notification, the uploader/writer must include a signature,
identification of the material, their name, address, telephone number, and
consent to jurisdiction in Federal District Court in the judicial district in the
address where they are located.159 The counter-notice must also state under

149 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 U.S. Copyright Office Summary, 1, Dec. 1, 1998, http://
www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
150 DMCA Safe Harbor, CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/to
pics/14 (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
151 Id.
152 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
153 Id. § 512(g).
154 Id. § 512(g)(2)(A).
155 Id. § 512(g)(3).
156 Id.
157 See id. § 512(c)(1)(C) (“[U]pon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or the subject of
infringing activity.”).
158 See id. § 512(g)(2)(b).
159 Id. § 512(g)(3).
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penalty of perjury that the counter-notice provider has a good faith belief that
the material does not infringe on copyright.160
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION CREATES INCENTIVES FOR COPYRIGHT
HOLDERS TO SUPPRESS MATERIAL THAT MAY NOT INFRINGE ON COPYRIGHT

These elements working together create the type of environment where
someone like James Joyce’s grandson can control dissemination of derivative
works long after the protected material was originally published. As material
proliferates online, an estate can work within the system to pull material off of
the Web, whether that material validly infringes on copyright or not. The
DMCA system puts the burden on the uploader to file a counter-notice, or see
their allegedly infringing material stay offline.
In practice, the Safe Harbor provisions of the DMCA work to silence
otherwise permissible freedom of expression. Such notices create incentives for
the service provider to pull every possibly infringing item off of their site, often
to the detriment of the uploader and possibly the public as a whole. In ALS
Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ, for example, the court refused to grant a service provider
immunity from infringement liability when a takedown notice was not even
entirely correct.161 Though takedown notices are required to be specific, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that since the notice substantially
complied with the DMCA’s requirements, the ISPs must abide by it.162 For
sites such as YouTube that host high amounts of material and receive many of
these notices, pursuing an independent investigation of whether the material
actually infringes on copyright is not feasible or rational. Instead, these service
providers will just pull the material down in order to maintain coverage under
the safe harbor provision. Thus, service providers often take such “takedown
notices” at face value without doing any further examination. Why would they?
It’s the safest course of action for them to remove the content and then shift
the burden back to the uploader to claim that it does not infringe upon
copyright. In doing so, ISPs remove themselves from the dispute between the
uploader and content owner.

160
161
162

Id. § 512(g)(3)(C).
239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id.
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B. THE MECHANISMS ALLOWING UPLOADERS TO PROTECT THEIR CONTENT
ARE INADEQUATE

1. The Fair Use Defense Online. The fair use defense is an obvious way for an
uploader to protect their content online.163 There is still some speculation
regarding the intersection of fair use and the First Amendment, but while “the
Supreme Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required,” the
Second Circuit noted that “some isolated statements in its opinions might
arguably be enlisted for such a requirement.”164 Nonetheless, the fair use
defense is granted by the Copyright Act and the DMCA, so arguments about
the rights of uploaders who claim fair use under these statutes parallel
arguments for constitutional protection in light of Eldred’s and Golan’s holding
that these statutes withstand a First Amendment challenge. Unfortunately for
uploaders, however, though the fair use defense would often lead to better
outcomes if they were actually sued, the fact that the DMCA’s notice system
leads to little actual litigation means that their interests in fair use are not often
vindicated.
Under Golan v. Holder, a significant part of the majority’s opinion argued
First Amendment concerns could still be vindicated because uploaders of
derivative content can rely on a fair use defense.165 Inherent in Justice
Ginsburg’s argument that the First Amendment protections of the CTEA
vindicated those who wished to perform or publish copyrighted works was the
idea that, when challenged, these alleged infringers would be able to bring the
fair use defense. However, increasing evidence demonstrates that under the
current DMCA system, uploaders who see their material pulled down are better
off just letting it happen, and uploading elsewhere, if at all. For a prime
example, one only needs to look at the Counter-Notification page online at the
University of Virginia.166 It contains such language as “[t]o be frank, it is rare
that the copyright infringement notices we forward to you are in error.”167 It
also notes that you should only file a counter-notice if “[Y]ou are certain you are
using the material legally.”168 As courts apply a balancing test for fair use
defense, it is difficult for someone who lacks a legal education (or even those
that have one) to be sure that they are using that material legally.

17 U.S.C. § 107.
Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2001).
165 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
166 Information Policy, Copyright at UVa: Counter-Notification, U. VA., http://www.virginia.edu/in
formationpolicy/copyright/counternotice.html (last modified Oct. 14, 2014).
167 Id.
168 Id. (emphasis added).
163
164
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The DMCA notice system is not only in place to protect rights-holders and
internet service providers; it is in place to notify uploaders as well of the
infringement alleged against them. Copyright holders could file suit against
those who have uploaded the material without filing a DMCA notice, and just
move straight to an injunction or litigation. The DMCA system provides
uploaders an opportunity to see that they could be sued before a copyright
holder actually sues. In theory, this sounds like a system where everyone
benefits. However, in practice it has become a system where copyright holders
can file false claims, leaving uploaders without a way to call them on their bluff.
Although uploaders could send a counter-notice, evidence shows these are
under-utilized. One reason for this may be the notice appears to indicate that
the uploader will be willing to defend the copyright in court, when an uploader
would really rather avoid litigation. Moreover, sending a counter-notice can
also be costly. Those that wish to file a counter-notice often need to consult a
lawyer to be able to do so correctly. There are also personal costs to the time
taken to create the counter-notice. In addition, DMCA takedown notices often
have intimidating language, which deters uploaders from uploading other
material, even if they do have a fair use defense.169
In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., Stephanie Lenz survived a motion to dismiss
when Universal had sent her a fraudulent copyright notice over its rights to the
Prince song “Let’s Go Crazy,” which she used in a twenty-nine-second lowquality video of her son dancing.170 In a striking parallel to cases of “malicious”
literary and orator estates, Prince stated that, on principal, no one should use his
music on the internet without permission, and Universal had done its best to
completely remove any non-sanctioned Prince music.171 The district court held
that individuals sending copyright notices must at least consider the fair use
defense before sending the notice, and that fair use is a lawful use of a
copyright, rather than an excuse after the fact.172 Additionally, the court made
an exceptional allowance due to Universal’s knowing misrepresentation and
awarded her the recovered costs of her actual damages stemming from the
fraudulent DMCA notice.173 Although this extraordinary outcome granted a
169 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (where
Universal’s bad faith takedown notice caused Lenz to be fearful enough to refrain from uploading
any other videos after the original takedown notice).
170 Id. at 1152.
171 Universal’s statement on the matter was “It’s simply a matter of principle. . . . [T]hat’s why,
over the last few months, we have asked YouTube to remove thousands of different videos that
use Prince music without his permission.” Id.
172 Id. at 1154–55 (“[I]n the majority of cases, a consideration of fair use prior to issuing a
takedown notice will not be so complicated as to jeopardize a copyright owner’s ability to
respond rapidly to potential infringements.”).
173 Id. at 1156.
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success to Ms. Lenz, the uploader who actually fights for his or her rights is an
exception to the rule.174
Another instance where uploaders successfully invoked the fair use defense
was illustrated in Online Policy Group v. Diebold, where a group of individuals
published e-mails about possible problems with Diebold voting machines.175
The court held that Diebold would be liable if they knowingly misrepresented
the fact that copyright infringement had occurred.176 However, like Lenz, this
case also features an exceptional plaintiff, as the takedown notices were sent to
a group that dealt with online policy—it is tough to believe that the other
plaintiffs would have brought the case on their own.177
2. Burden-Shifting. Even if the fair use defense adequately protects the
interests of uploaders, in some circumstances the DMCA contains a provision
that ultimately unfairly turns the tables against those who upload content. This
can be problematic for uploaders from out of the country (who now must
consent to jurisdiction inside the United States).178 Section 12 raises another
problem for uploaders. When their media content is removed from the
internet, they have one option to return it online: consent to possibly go to
court against the estate.179 The term “safe harbor provision” means that section
512 protects the service provider.180 Therefore, if the uploader does want to
sue, they cannot sue the party who actually removed the content. Instead, they
must consent to suit by an estate, often a group of heirs that have a
considerable amount of money at their disposal.
C. ESTATES ARE SPECIAL CASES

Estates, especially those that own rights of famous authors and creators, and
want to use their power to pull information out of the public sphere, often have
a great deal of money at their disposal, which gives them a unique ability to
utilize the imbalances of the DMCA.181 This creates a disincentive for
individual uploaders with credible copyright defenses to litigate them. For a
clear example of the costs of litigation, one need look no further than Carol

Ganz, supra note 10, at 758.
Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
176 Id. at 1202.
177 Id. at 1197. The co-plaintiffs, Nelson Pavlosky and Luke Smith were college students who
posted the e-mail archive on other websites.
178 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(D).
179 § 512(g)(3)(D).
180 Id. § 512(b)(1).
181 See Pomerantz & Greenburg, supra note 11 (citing celebrities’ estates as profitable,
particularly due to royalties).
174
175
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Schloss’s legal battle with the James Joyce estate.182 To avoid a lawsuit with the
Joyce estate, Carol Schloss, an academic, edited over thirty pages out of a four
hundred page manuscript after the executor of the estate wrote to her,
threatening her if she were to use material about Lucia Joyce.183 She was able to
recover $240,000 in legal fees from the estate, but only after considerable
amounts of litigation and uncertainty.184
Another reason why estates somewhat differ from individual copyright
holders is because they are not the creator of the work. The estate is the work’s
protector, the creator’s protector, and most importantly, the estate is often the
work’s beneficiary. Our society values the idea that heirs are simply the people
who the author was trying to provide for with his or her work. Yet the
possibility of an estate that not only benefits from the works of its forebear, but
attempts to exclude the author’s work from society as a whole has not seemed
to concern many courts or legislatures. For example, in drafting the Copyright
Term Extension Act Congress considered what the views of authors and their
heirs would be, but did not consider the impact on society as a whole.185
Our copyright law also establishes that copyright protection does not die
with the author.186 However, the assumption grounding this policy—that heirs
will be good custodians of the author’s property—may not be based in facts.187
Estates do not always act rationally. The Joyce estate, for example has even
attempted to prevent academic discussion of the work.188 Likewise, the Salinger
estate (and Salinger himself) worked to prohibit an arguably derivative work and
a collection of letters from Salinger from going to the public.189 Finally, the
Martin Luther King Estate has prohibited showing of the “I Have a Dream”
speech, one of the greatest speeches of the twentieth century.190
Another relevant question pertains to the identification of those heirs that
an author would generally intend to benefit. Though, as noted by the Berne
Convention and offered as evidence of the need for the CTEA, the average
lifespan of most industrialized nations are increasing, this cannot really provide
support for leaving copyright protections at life of the author plus seventy
See Haven, supra note 88.
515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073 (2007).
184 Id. at 1083; see also Haven, supra note 88.
185 Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and Intellectual Property: The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011
WIS. L. REV. 219, 225.
186 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(extending copyright protections to life of the author plus seventy years).
187 See Symposium, supra note 185, at 222.
188 See id. at 258.
189 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
190 “I Have a Dream” Leads Top 100 Speeches of the Century, U. WIS.-MADISON NEWS (Dec. 15,
1999), http://www.news.wisc.edu/releases/3504.html.
182
183
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years.191 One commentator illustrated this through a thought experiment: if one
assumes that every generation is about twenty-five years, protections for an
author born in 1971 who dies in 2046 will extend until 2116.192 At that point,
the author’s great-grandchildren will be sixty years old.193 Thus, the current
copyright system protects heirs who are extremely far removed from the
authors themselves.194 It is difficult to draw specific lines in policy discussions
but it is hard to believe that the creativity associated with a work will receive
greater honor after seventy years than it would after thirty or fifty years,
especially as the beneficiaries of the copyright become further and further
removed from the creator.
The amount of control estates seek to assert over written works could be
equated with a kind of fetish195: an irrational attachment to the work to the
detriment of society.196 Considered in conjunction with the fact that
copyrighted works are nonrivalrous,197 the personal interests of descendants are
not interests to which copyright law and policy should elevate.198
D. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS OF COPYRIGHT

One of the relevant First Amendment considerations noted by the dissent in
Golan was the impact of dissemination of information.199 The actions of
controlling estates such as the Joyce, Martin Luther King, and J.D. Salinger
estates undeniably worked against information dissemination. In addition, the
features of the DMCA have given estates another tool with which to control
information dissemination.
Some works of authorship retain value very well over the course of a long
life.200 However, the Constitution states that copyright must be for a limited
191 William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 907, 931–32 (1997).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See Symposium, supra note 185, at 266; see also Schloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068,
1073 (2007) (Joyce told Shloss’s publisher that her fair use claim “sounds like a bad joke or
wishful thinking” and furthermore asked the publisher to “kindly bear in mind that there are
more than one way [sic] to skin a cat”).
196 Symposium, supra note 185, at 266.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200 See, for example, CATCHER IN THE RYE, which is still often assigned for classes or summer
reading to this day, or a copy of the first edition of ULYSSES that sold for £275,000 in 2009. Mark
Brown, First Edition of Ulysses Sells for Record £275,000, THE GUARDIAN (June 4, 2009), http://
www.theguardian.com/books/2009/jun/04/ulysses-sells-record-price.
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time.201 The fact that the Constitution calls for a limited time would seem to
imply that such a time should be reasonable. But it seems unreasonable that the
great-grandchildren of authors or orators can benefit from their greatgrandfather’s copyrighted work.
In Golan, Justice Ginsburg also based her decision on the rationale that
taking a work simply be licensed.202 This rationale, however, does not apply to
many of the situations discussed above, especially where an author or orator
estate attempts to prevent a work from entering the public sphere at all.
In addition, Justice Ginsburg read the statue in Golan as requiring users to
pay for copyrighted works.203 Again, when it comes to biographers, letters, and
speeches especially, there may not be much value in licensing. Ginsburg’s
argument also hinges on the idea that the copyright holder would be willing to
license the material out, whether for personal gain or for the betterment of
society. In fact, copyright holders may instead attempt to control the
dissemination of information, to prohibit something from coming to light that
they do not agree with, or attempt to protect the creator’s image or integrity of
the work.204
In Golan, Justice Breyer highlighted the problem this poses for those who
want to use the work.205 His concerns are exacerbated for those who want to
post material online. To maintain compliance with the law, someone wishing to
use the material must track down the copyright owner.206 If they do not, or the
copyright owner refuses to comply, the copyright owner can send a takedown
notice under the DMCA, which will allow the host site to remove the
supposedly offending material. However, much of this goes unnoticed by
courts because the system inherently works to keep these issues out of court. A
common course of action when one receives a counter notice is to simply do
nothing, and allow the material to be pulled off the Web. It is easy to see how
an uploader would choose this, if they appeared to be facing off against an
estate or a corporation that had considerable amounts of money at its disposal.
They also may simply not have a particularly vested interest in maintaining the
content online. While pulling their material off the Web may damage
uploaders’ interests, it could be more difficult for uploaders to subject
themselves to litigation, especially if they are not very well funded. In addition,
the notice and takedown system fails to consider the public interest in making
the work available to a broader audience.
201
202
203
204
205
206

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8 (“by securing for limited times”).
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 893 (majority opinion).
See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 905.
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Many DMCA claims also are without merit.207 In 2009, Google estimated
that more than half of the DMCA takedown notices it received were sent by
businesses targeting competitors and 37% of notices were not valid copyright
claims.208 The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse maintains a database of ceaseand desist and takedown letters online.209 In a study by the Brennan Center for
Justice and New York University School of Law, researchers examined many of
these takedown notices, and found that almost half of them sought to remove
material with what appear to be solid fair use or First Amendment defenses.210
Even with these high numbers of invalid claims, there is still not impetus for an
alleged infringer to fight a DMCA notice.
While we have discussed burdens placed on uploaders of content, there are
also valid considerations as to estates themselves and children of authors. One
rationale behind copyright protection for written works is that it is often
claimed that a motivation for writing is the need to provide for children.211
This claim may or may not hold water. For example, it is unlikely that Martin
Luther King copyrighted the “I Have a Dream” speech in order to provide for
his children, at least in monetary terms. In addition, the literary market is
extremely difficult to break into—the vast majority of books are doomed to
obscurity and make very little money.212 In addition, this assertion does not
take into account other forms of writing—letters that have been given to
museums, recordings of speeches, and other works that may have literary value
but in general are not monetized. Any author who has achieved fame within his
or her lifetime can expect that one of his or her letters may someday find its
way into a museum, just as a famous orator would expect a speech to be
transcribed.
Since author estates owned by creators’ children are not actually the
speakers, just the “enablers” of a copyrighted speech, their only interests that
appear to relate to the First Amendment involve the suppression, rather than
expression of speech.213 As mentioned, they may keep media and works out of
the public sphere to prohibit certain kinds of discussion about the work. It is
strange that the First Amendment would reach out to protect suppression of
speech by the heirs of the original speakers more than expression by others.

207 Google Provides Numbers on Just how Often DMCA Takedown Process is Abused, TECHDIRT,
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090315/2033134126.shtml (last visited Sept. 2, 2014).
208 Id.
209 CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Oct. 27,
2014).
210 See Meyers, supra note 13, at 233–34.
211 See Symposium, supra note 185, at 256.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 258–60.
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Furthermore, once the original creator has passed away, it is extremely difficult
to determine what their interests actually were when creating the work.
One area where estates may have a legitimate First Amendment interest is
freedom of association. It seems obvious that the law should prohibit someone
from impersonating the author or estate, and that the estate has a valid First
Amendment interest in not wanting to appear to endorse speech that they do
not agree with (or just do not want to exist).214 However, there are sufficient
safeguards in place to deal with impersonation of an author, but copyright
owners are protected by the Copyright Act’s requirements for derivative
works.215
E. SOLUTIONS

The problem of the “malicious estate” highlighted the need for new
solutions to copyright problems online in the digital age. Though a complete
overhaul of our current system seems unlikely, three proposals could help to fix
the problems.
Many of Justice Ginsburg’s considerations as to the
constitutionality of the statutes in Golan and Eldred have been warped in the
years since those decisions. Most importantly, the fair use defense has not been
the bulwark against expression-related harms that the majority felt it would be.
The problem of the “malicious” estate, and the ease with which that estate can
exercise its power has highlighted the need for new copyright protection
schemes. One possibility is a limited licensing scheme that would still respect
the rights of authors and their heirs while making it easier for those who wish to
use materials do so at a reasonable price. In addition, recent developments in
copyright protection have made it easier for internet providers to monitor their
own networks. Legal scholars have also proposed other copyright frameworks
that would increase the ability for uploaders of content to vindicate their First
Amendment rights.
1. Modified Licensing System. When attempting to craft policy solutions to the
issues arising from the intersection of the DMCA, malicious estates, especially
the problems created by imposing these costs on educators and those seeking to
publish works or incorporate works of authors and orators into their writings, it
is helpful to look to Justice Breyer’s concerns in Golan. Justice Breyer mostly
focused on concerns about spurring the creation of new works, and the issue of
orphan works (those works that would be impossible to locate and correctly
use). In addition, in Eldred, Justice Breyer confronted the idea of “expression
214 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that speakers have a right to determine their message and not convey that of other
groups).
215 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
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related harm”—a strong First Amendment concern that the CTE would
interfere with efforts to educate, and restrict propagation of copyright works, in
part, because the term extension made copyright “virtually perpetual,”
benefitting not those who created works, but rather those estates that still held
the rights to them.
Licensing fees could work to curb the heavy burden on content uploaders
under the DMCA.216 The government could set the fees, or they could be
regulated by the industries themselves. Another solution often proposed is the
one espoused by the litigants in Eldred—to pull back the copyright period after
an author’s death. In short, they would call on Congress to restrict the
copyright period to some length of time substantially shorter than seventy years,
replacing the CTEA.
If we look to the concerns of Justice Breyer, however, it appears that we
should take a more limited view than just applying licensing fees across the
board to all material on the internet. This would also be overbroad, would have
the end result of chilling speech, and would not take into consideration the
built-in defenses to copyright claims. Furthermore, there may be less disruptive
means of changing our current copyright landscape.
I would propose a solution that merges both ideas, at least in terms of online
material. After some shorter period than seventy years, such as twenty,
copyrights would not lose protection, but would rather lapse into a licensing
scheme. This would completely preserve the author’s rights during life, and
keep them operating functionally the same way from much of their heirs’ life.
Licensing fees would need to be regulated to deal with the “malicious estate”
problem, but would allow more materials to be posted online. In addition, for
those whose works have a high level of cultural value, a system where people
can pay a reasonable fee to use the material could lead to higher profits. Since
the U.S. government already issues copyright protections, it could also help with
the orphan works issue to have an automatic licensing system. In short, if one
only needed to look up in a database where to send the licensing fee to, it would
eliminate the problem of tracking that creator down.
A unique function of the DMCA is of course the notice and takedown
system. Under a post-death online copyright licensing scheme the notices
themselves could be harnessed to provide more avenues for those who want to
use material to be able to do so without risking a visit to court to vindicate their
fair use rights.

216 Congress already requires mandatory licensing in some areas. See id. § 115. In addition,
licensing schemes have been proposed as early as 1878. See also Symposium, supra note 185, at
241–42.
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2. Remove Safe Harbor/Increase the Requirements of the Provision for Internet Service
Providers. Another possible solution to mitigate the abuse of DMCA takedown
notices by uncompromising estates or other copyright holders in general would
be to alter the safe harbor provision to incentivize service providers to
investigate the allegedly infringing material before pulling it off the internet.
The obvious problem with this solution is implementation. Service providers
do not have time to look at every single notice that they receive because they
receive such a high volume. Therefore, the idea of compelling each ISP to
review each allegedly infringing material before pulling it seems far-fetched.
However, with increases in the power of technology, signs point towards a time
when such a requirement would be feasible with automation. As an example,
Google processed around eight URL takedowns per second during the last
week of September 2013.217 Though Google is certainly an outlier on the high
end of DMCA notice recipients, they have implemented some safeguards to
prevent erroneous URLs from being taken down from their search service,
perhaps because they have even received allegedly infringing URLs that lead to
their own “Gmail” service.218 The fact that Google can implement some basic
safeguards demonstrates that this is something that could be done by normal
ISPs in the future, even if not at the moment.
In all, the incentivization for service providers to better investigate allegedly
infringing material would not be complete until the safe harbor provision is
altered. The safe harbor provision should not be removed, however. It should
just be modified by language requiring a good faith effort to determine whether
the allegedly infringing copyright material actually infringes upon copyright.
Furthermore, with such a system there is another problem of implementation:
that a service provider may, in an effort to protect itself, pull much more
material than is necessary off the Web by using automated services. For a
prime example of this problem, one needs only look to YouTube copyright
“crackdown” that happened in late 2013.219 Such automated systems can be
overbroad, and open up service providers to liability for a lax effort to
determine what content is permissible incentivizes those service providers to
aggressively remove materials.

217 Gmail Stays Up as Google Rejects Microsoft DMCA Takedown Notice, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 2,
2013), http://torrentfreak.com/gmail-stays-up-as-google-rejects-microsoft-dmca-takedown-notic
e-131102/.
218 Id.
219 See Owen Good, YouTube’s Copyright Crackdown: Everything You Need To Know, KOTAKU, Dec. 18,
2013, available at http://kotaku.com/youtube-copyright-crackdown-simple-answers-to-compli-14859
99937; see also Paul Tassi, YouTube Unleashes Strange Storm of Copyright Claims on Video Game Content
Producers, FORBES, Dec. 11, 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2013/12/11/
youtube-unleashes-strange-storm-of-copyright-claims-on-video-game-content-producers/.
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3. Alternative Proposals. Some legal scholars have endorsed a copyright
system that turns on a fixed number of years without renewals. Such a system
would have a long period (one proposal lists it at ninety-five years).220 This
would create some sense of certainty in terms of copyright period, but would
do little to help those who wished to assert a defense under the Copyright Act
online. Another possibility offered by legal scholars is to create a copyright that
would exist perpetually, but would require frequent renewals. This solution
would generally only be economically feasible for the copyright holder to
maintain for around fifteen years.221 Therefore, it would lead to more works
entering the public domain as rights holders let copyrights lapse rather than
spend the money to renew them. It would also allow works that are actually
valuable to stay protected by copyright as long as they remained valuable.222
Since more total works would be in the public domain, the amount of DMCA
notices would decrease, and in all more First Amendment protections would be
vindicated. However, this perpetual copyright solution demanding renewal
would do nothing to protect against estates that have a great deal of money and
are willing to expend the effort to keep works from entering the public domain.
To be sure, none of these policy proposals would completely eliminate the
problems springing from the DMCA. By their nature, any of these proposals
strikes some sort of balance between rights-holders and content upholders.
However, a modified licensing system would likely go the farthest in protecting
expression, provided licensing fees could actually be kept reasonable. Those
worried about vindicating their expression rights under the first amendment,
however, may not need to worry for very long, as technology may soon come to
the point where it can identify those items with fair use defenses online.
IV. CONCLUSION
If all else fails, much of the root of the problems under the DMCA can be
traced back to the fact that people cannot adequately vindicate their rights when
they receive a DMCA notice.223 With an estate protecting a lucrative copyright,
there is a decided power imbalance that leads to an inordinate amount of
material pulled from the Web.224 As exemplified by these powerful estates,
copyright power can be abused. When it comes to the work of authors and
orators, there is a definite educational value to be gained in publication of their
works, and a dedicated fair use protection for these educational purposes.
220
221
222
223
224

See Symposium, supra note 185, at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Ganz, supra note 10, at 758.
Id.
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The DMCA’s shift of power from uploaders to copyright holders is felt
particularly strongly in the context of a malicious author or orator estate. Here,
there are often materials that should be allowed by fair use (such as those used
for educational purposes). However, a powerful estate, rather than the original
creator of the content, can wield great power over the materials online. As
DMCA takedown notices render fair use, they are inadequate to vindicate
uploaders’ First Amendment rights. Under the CTEA’s life plus seventy years
provision, this problem will not go away any time soon. In addition to their
failure to vindicate fair use defenses, the incentives created by the current
DMCA system leads uploaders to let their material be pulled off the Web, if
they even find out that it has been removed in the first place. Though much of
the DMCA system goes on behind the scenes, rather than in courtrooms, as we
enter a more digitally oriented society these problems are only going to become
more and more visible. Currently what we see litigated is just the tip of the
iceberg—lurking beneath the surface is a greater danger to our freedom of
expression online.
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